Abstract-This paper provides an answer to an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while most people know little about their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We combine administrative and self-reported pension data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives and document an important role for self-reported pension data in determining retirement behavior. Well-informed individuals are far more responsive to pension incentives than the average individual. Ill-informed individuals seem to respond systematically to their own misperceptions of pension incentives.
I. Introduction
T HIS paper addresses an important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature: while most people do not know the details of their own pension plans, retirement behavior is strongly affected by pension incentives. We show that people respond to incentives that they know about and that estimated responses of retirement to financial incentives are driven by a minority of the population who are well-informed about those incentives. Our empirical approach combines employer-reported and self-reported data to measure the retirement response to actual and perceived financial incentives. We find that uninformed people show no response to their actual retirement incentives while well-informed people respond much more than previously thought.
Understanding how responsiveness to pension incentives is related to knowledge of these incentives is important for policy discussions. Virtually all of the recent empirical research on responsiveness to financial retirement incentives is based on administrative data, and several recent studies use their estimates to simulate or forecast the response to policy changes such as altering the normal retirement age or benefit levels. 1 While such estimates may accurately capture an average effect, we find that this average masks a tremendous amount of heterogeneity in individual responsiveness that is directly related to individuals' knowledge of pension incentives. Because alternative policy changes and their specific implementation will almost certainly be associated with different levels of transparency and public knowledge, we need to understand how this knowledge interacts with the incentives to accurately predict which types of individuals are most likely to respond and what their responses will be.
Our findings also have important implications beyond understanding retirement behavior. While much applied economic research seeks to measure the responsiveness of individuals to certain incentives, we are aware of no other study that has made such a direct comparison between the responsiveness to self-reported and administratively reported measures of incentives. The issues raised in this study are relevant to a variety of economic policies. For example, would individuals respond more strongly to the various tax-favored savings vehicles if they knew what these complex incentives are? 2 And, would workers respond differently to the earned income tax credit if they realized the precise marginal tax rate at each level of earnings? At a minimum, our results suggest that heterogeneity in individual knowledge can lead to significant heterogeneity in responses. The availability of self-and employer-reported pension data provides a unique opportunity to quantify the extent to which individuals' lack of information is related to reduced responsiveness to economic incentives.
Our analysis below uses self-reported, employerreported, and Social Security Administration data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) . To examine the relationship between knowledge of retirement benefits and individuals' responsiveness to those benefits, we begin by calculating two versions of financial retirement incentives, one based on self-reported data, and another based on employer-reported and administrative data. Our maintained hypothesis is that while the self-reports reflect individual beliefs, the employer reports represent individuals' true pensions. As discussed below, we focus our analysis on defined-benefit pension plans for which this latter assumption is most defensible. In addition, we present some evidence below that speaks to the plausibility of this assumption and investigates other potential interpretations of our results. It is straightforward to show that both the self-and employer-reported versions of these incentives affect retirement, and that the self-reports continue to be strongly significant determinants of retirement even after controlling for the employer reports.
By comparing the self-reports with the employer reports of individuals' pensions, we can construct summary measures of knowledge-the extent to which individual beliefs coincide with the true pensions. When these knowledge measures are interacted with the incentives based on employer-provided data, we show that the better-informed fraction of the population generates all of the average response to pension incentives, and that the ill-informed segment of the population shows no significant response. We further show that this ill-informed population is not completely unresponsive to incentives, but rather, this population is responsive to its own misperceptions of the incentives.
Our analyses draw upon two strands of the recent retirement literature. The first of these includes studies that examine the extent of information that individuals possess about their future retirement benefits. The common finding across these studies is that such information is typically quite incomplete. The work of Gustman and Steinmeier (2001b, 2004) using the HRS sets the stage for our work. 3 They examine the determinants of knowledge of Social Security and private pensions, and the implications of this knowledge for retirement planning. They find, for example, that only half of respondents can correctly identify the type of pension plan (defined benefit versus defined contribution) in which they participate, and that age, union membership, longer planning horizons, and certain retirement planning activities signal individuals who are better informed about their pensions. In addition, they find that workers who initially overestimate their available benefits retire later than they had originally planned.
A related part of the literature shows the potential for behavioral responses to interventions that alter individuals' information sets. Duflo and Saez (2003) demonstrate that small incentives that encourage individuals to learn more about retirement savings vehicles can have significant effects on participation in retirement savings plans. Their results echo earlier findings by Bernheim and Garrett (2003) that show large effects of financial education on individual savings and other behavior.
Also related to the lack of knowledge about pension incentives is work by Choi et al. (2001) . They find that employees tend to follow the "path of least resistance" and that the default options in an employers' pension plan have a major impact on participation in the plan and on the participants' saving behavior and investment portfolio. While this is not evidence of a lack of knowledge per se, it is certainly consistent with individual behavior that does not pay a great deal of attention to finances and financial incentives.
The second strand of relevant literature includes virtually all studies that examine the effects of private pension incentives on retirement and much of the related work on Social Security incentives. Many papers have utilized data from employer reports or administrative sources, and they have generally found that individuals are quite responsive to the financial incentives embedded in pension plans and Social Security. Stock and Wise (1990) and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992) estimate both structural and reduced-form models of the retirement decision using data provided by a single large employer. Samwick (1998) uses the employer-provided data on private pensions from the Survey of Consumer Finances to estimate a regression-based counterpart to existing structural models of retirement, focusing on the role of forward-looking financial retirement incentives, or "option value," in determining the probability of retirement. In a similar approach, both Coile and Gruber (2000) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2001a) use employer-provided pension data, along with administrative records of Social Security earnings histories, to estimate the effect of private pensions and Social Security on retirement. Our analyses below is the first to provide a direct link between this literature that uses administrative data to study retirement behavior, and the growing evidence that many of these incentives are not well understood by the individuals whose decisions we are modeling.
A possible explanation for why individuals seem to respond to incentives that they do not apparently know is that the level of individuals' true pension knowledge may be inaccurately measured. We present evidence below that this is unlikely to be the case. While it is almost certainly true that self-reported pension data are measured with some error, financial incentive measures based on these selfreported data are significant predictors of retirement behavior, even after conditioning on incentives based on employerreported data. This confirms results from Chan and Stevens (2004) that show, after controlling for earlier retirement expectations or individual-specific fixed effects, the selfreported financial incentives are still important determinants of retirement behavior.
Another key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that self-reported data, while largely ignored by economists when administrative data are available, do provide relevant information. This is an important finding given the extensive effort devoted to the collection of self-reported data, and the rarity with which some of these data have been used to study behavior. If self-reported data are truly so poorly measured as to be uninformative, that would raise questions of whether they should continue to be collected. However, as we illustrate below in the case of retirement decisionmaking, the self-reported data are extremely useful in understanding how these decisions are made.
II. Data and Samples
We use data from the first four waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), including (i) the self-reported, publicly released data on retirement income sources and retirement behavior, (ii) the matched employer-provided pension plan details, and (iii) the matched Social Security earnings histories. While the self-reported pension data are available for all waves, the employer-provided pension data are available only for jobs held at or before wave 1 of the survey. 4 Similarly, the administrative earnings histories include Social Security-covered earnings only up to the initial wave. However, it is still possible to use the employerprovided data to judge the accuracy of self-reported private pension information in multiple waves because job changes are not very frequent at this age range. Individuals who do change employers before retirement are dropped from our samples, as is the small fraction of individuals who report changes to their pension plans between waves. 5 The wage histories from Social Security records are supplemented with self-reported earnings in subsequent years so that Social Security benefits can be calculated for later waves as well. Because of this projection of the administrative data to subsequent waves, we control for the survey wave in our analysis and have found similar results across the initial and later waves.
A. Measuring Retirement Incentives
Using the self-and employer-reported data on pensions, our first step is to take the pension plan details and use them to construct the present value of pension wealth available to the individual at each possible future retirement age. For individuals self-reporting defined-benefit (DB) pensions, we have information from each survey wave on annual benefit amounts, the normal retirement (pension eligibility) age, the early retirement age, cost-of-living adjustments, and benefit reduction amounts in the case of early retirement. For those reporting defined-contribution (DC) pensions, we have information on the current account balance, employer and own contributions, and basic portfolio allocation decisions for existing DC accounts. These pieces of data are combined to generate estimates of the present value of pension wealth at each possible retirement age. The employer-provided reports of pension plans, while more detailed, contain similar information for each pension plan, and we generate analogous present values using the HRS-provided Pension Estimation Program (Curtin, 1998) . For all present-value calculations, we assume a discount factor of 3%, and weight future values by age-and gender-specific survival probabilities taken from Social Security Administration actuarial tables. More details on these calculations are given in the data appendix.
Following previous studies, we use these present values to construct financial incentive measures that are based on the difference between (i) the present value of pension wealth if an individual retires at the future date that maximizes his or her present value of pension wealth, and (ii) the present value of pension wealth if an individual retires today. We refer to this measure as an individual's "pension gain":
where GAIN it is the pension gain of individual i at time t, and R is the retirement date. 6 We assume that all workers retire by age 70 and thus calculate pension wealth for retirement dates up to this age, although results are not sensitive to this simplification.
B. Accuracy of the Employer Reports
We follow many previous researchers in assuming that the employer and Social Security administrative data represent the true benefit information. In the case of employer reports, this assumption may not be accurate for a number of reasons. First, an employer that offers more than one pension plan may match the wrong plan to a given respondent. Second, the plan information provided by employers must be linked to respondent-reported age and job tenure in order to generate estimates of pension wealth or benefits. To the extent that respondents misreport these variables, the estimates of pension wealth from employer reports will be inaccurate. Third, as noted by Engelhardt, Cunningham, and Kumar (2005) and Uccello and Perese (1999) , the assumption that the employer data represent the truth is especially problematic for DC pension accounts since employers do not know how much is in each employee's account, or how much the employee contributes on a voluntary basis. Indeed, it is possible that the self-reports could be more accurate than the employer reports for DC plans. This is a serious concern because if cases in which employer and self-reports differ reflect measurement error in the employer reports, rather than misinformation, our findings of reduced responsiveness among the "uninformed" could be entirely explained by measurement error.
We address such concerns in several ways. First, most of our analysis is restricted to individuals with an employerreported DB pension plan (although we generally get very similar results when the full sample is used). Various procedures have been suggested for correcting the employerreported DC pension data (Engelhardt, Cunningham, & Kumar, 2005, and Gustman & Steinmeier, 2004) , but none of these seem likely to result in DC pension data that is as clean and complete as the DB plan data. (See the data appendix for details on how the employer-reported DC 4 Employer-reported pension plans have recently been collected from wave 4 employers as well; however, the number of individuals for whom these reports are available is quite small. 5 Individuals are asked whether there have been any changes to their pension plans since the previous survey. They are then asked about the details of their pensions, even if they report no change since the previous wave. pension variables were calculated.) For the sample of DB pension recipients, we are more confident that the pension incentive measures based on employer reports reflect the true pension incentives. Rohwedder (2003) provides a detailed examination of differences across employer-and self-reported pensions and notes that "for capturing important retirement incentives that are associated with sudden increases in entitlements at the time of the early and normal retirement age . . . this employer information can be very valuable, especially if estimating retirement models that are particularly sensitive even to small mismeasurement of the incentive structure, like option value models." Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) similarly argue that, for DB plans, the employer-reported pension documents are likely to be quite accurate, particularly for measuring nonlinear accumulation patterns that are key to our measured retirement incentives.
Even after limiting our sample to DB pension plans, we further consider whether measurement error could be driving our main findings. First, we show below that some measures of knowledge have no significant effect on individuals' responsiveness to their pensions, even though such measures would be just as likely to reflect measurement error in the employer reports as our preferred knowledge measures that do have significant effects on responsiveness. Finally, we present results from an instrumental variables estimation approach that are inconsistent with a story in which measurement error in the employer-reported pension data drives our main findings.
C. Accuracy of the Self-Reports
While the self-reported data are useful because they reflect what individuals actually know or believe about their pensions, many researchers have expressed concerns that self-reports may also contain substantial measurement error. That is, self-reported pension details may differ from those derived from employer reports not only because individuals do not know the information, but also because they misreport what they actually do know. Given our findings below that individuals seem to respond directly to their selfreported pension measures, it seems unlikely that measurement error in individuals' pension beliefs is pervasive.
Nonetheless, one potential limitation of our approach arises if the self-reported data on pensions are simply not complex enough to capture the true incentives from DB pension plans. Individuals are asked a limited number of questions about the structure of their pension plans, and it is possible that what we label as misinformation instead reflects the limitations of the survey instrument's ability to capture individuals' beliefs about their complex pension structures. To address this concern, we ask how much of the sample variation in the retirement incentive (GAIN, as defined above in equation [1] ) from DB pensions can be explained with only a few data elements that are elicited directly in the self-reported pension questionnaire. That is, in a world where individuals have perfect knowledge, would the self-reports be sufficient to explain the variation in incentives constructed from the more complex employer reports?
Specifically, we estimate regression decompositions of the employer-reported GAIN measures that include as regressors only the following terms and their interactions: dummies for current age, normal retirement age, and early retirement age; the normal retirement benefit amount; and the early retirement benefit amount (all measured from the employer-reported data). These five features of the pension plans explain approximately 75% of the variation in GAIN, suggesting that they do have the potential to capture the vast majority of variation in reported pension incentives. Another way to summarize the ability of these few data elements to capture DB pension incentives is to consider the correlation between GAIN and a predicted GAIN measure from these regressions. This correlation is 0.87. In contrast, the correlation between GAIN from the employer reports and GAIN from the self-reports is 0.22. The first reported correlation coefficient shows that it is possible for just a few data elements to capture the variation in GAIN, so that the relatively low value for the second correlation coefficient cannot result simply from limitations of the survey instrument. Table 1 shows summary statistics for our sample. To be included in the analyses, individuals must have an employerreported pension plan, and cannot yet be retired at the time of the wave 1 survey. We consider the probability of retirement at each different age between the wave 1 and Notes: Pooled data from waves 1-4 of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The sample includes all HRS respondents for whom there is an employer-reported pension at wave 1. Further details are given in section II of the text.
D. Sample Characteristics
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wave 4 surveys. Observations from the wave 1 survey are excluded, since (by our sample definition) all retirements occur following wave 1. Individuals remain in the sample through wave 4, or until they retire. Thirteen percent of all observations reflect a retirement in the current year, while 40% of individuals in our sample have retired by the time of the wave 4 survey. Slightly more than half of the sample is male, more than three-quarters are married, and the average age is just over 58 years. The sample includes 5% Hispanic respondents and 16% black respondents. Average annual earnings over the lifetime (calculated from Social Security Administration earnings records) is around $23,000 in 1992 dollars. Because much of our analysis will focus on individuals with a DB pension plan, the next two columns of the table separate those with a DB pension plan (according to the employer reports) and those with only DC (or mixed) pension plans. There are only small differences in these basic characteristics between those who have a DB plan (from any employer) and those who do not.
The lower section of table 1 provides means for key summary measures of pension wealth, based on both selfand employer reports. The average level of nonpension assets is roughly $278,000. The average level of pension wealth (assuming the individual retires in the current year) is approximately $69,000 (in 1992 dollars) based on selfreports, but is more than $153,000 according to the employer reports. The average pension gain (the present value of pension wealth if retirement occurs at the wealthmaximizing age minus the present value if retirement occurs today) is higher in the self-reports: $56,534 versus $25,152 from the employer reports. This suggests that individuals, on average, overestimate the financial gain from delaying retirement. However, if we consider median values of pension gain, this ranking is reversed: the median pension gain based on self-reports is $0, while the median pension gain from employer reports is $11,489. For those with DB plans the median pension gain is $0 based on self-reports, but approximately $21,000 based on employer reports. For those with only DC plans the median pension gain is $0 from both sets of reports. The large number of zero pension gain values occurs because some individuals have pensions from previous jobs (that are reported both by previous employers and by the respondents themselves). For these individuals, continued work with their current employer will not change their accumulated pension wealth. 7 The final rows of table 1 show the average age at which pension wealth will be maximized according to the alternative pension reports. On average, individuals believe their wealth will be maximized at age 61, while the employer reports suggest a later age of 63. Among those with no defined-benefit plans, this average wealth-maximizing age from employer reports is only 64, which seems surprising since DC pension wealth will generally continue rising as long as contributions are being made and so wealth will be maximized at age 70 (because we assume that all workers retire by age 70). In fact, these average results are driven by individuals with DC accounts for which contributions are no longer being made, primarily DC accounts from previous jobs. If we restrict the sample to those with pensions on their current jobs and ignore pensions from previous jobs, the average age of maximal pension wealth from employer reports is 63 for those with DB plans and 67 for those without a DB plan. 8 Notes: Pooled data from waves 1-4 of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The sample includes all HRS respondents for whom there is an employer-reported pension at wave 1. Further details are given in section II of the text.
E. Measures of Knowledge
individuals report "don't know" when asked about the value of their pension. Specifically, we construct a variable, REPORT, that is equal to 1 for individuals who report enough of the key components of their pension plans to allow us to construct the present value of benefits at various possible retirement ages. 9 If individuals report not knowing some major component of their pension, REPORT is set equal to 0. As noted by Gustman and Steinmeier, a large fraction of individuals report not knowing the value of their pension. In our sample, just over a third have REPORT equal to 0.
An alternative measure used in previous work is to compare the present value of an individual's level of pension wealth based on the self-report with that based on the administrative report. 10 To implement this, we create a variable KNOW_LEVEL that is equal to 1 if (i) the ratio of the self-reported to employer-reported pension wealth is between 0.5 and 2, or (ii) one of the reported pension wealth values is 0 and the other is less than $5,000. The second component of this definition is included to avoid misclassifying as uninformed those who report zero wealth rather than very small amounts of pension wealth. For those who do not report enough information on their pension to calculate the value of pension wealth (REPORT ϭ 0), we set KNOW_LEVEL equal to 0. We do this also for similar variables discussed below. Among those with REPORT equal to 1, table 2 shows that 51% of our sample report levels of pension wealth relatively close to those based on the employer reports.
Because we are primarily interested in individuals' knowledge of the financial incentive to retire inherent in their pension structure, we calculate a third measure that captures the accuracy of individuals' knowledge of their pension gain (as defined in equation [1] ). After calculating each individual's pension gain using both self-and employerreported values, the variable KNOW_GAIN is set equal to 1 if the ratio of pension gain based on self-and employer reports is between 0.5 and 2, or if one is 0 and the other is within $5,000. Table 2 shows that 27% of our sample is well-informed regarding this more complex measure of the incentive effect of pensions. This measure requires individuals to understand benefit eligibility ages, amounts, and reductions at alternative hypothetical retirement ages.
The second and third columns of table 2 split the sample into those with and without a defined-benefit plan (based on the employer reports). For both REPORT and KNOW_ LEVEL, those with a DB plan are more knowledgeable than those without. However, when the knowledge measure is based on knowing actual pension gain (KNOW_GAIN), individuals with a DB plan are far less likely to be informed. This is not surprising since DB plans are usually associated with a more complex incentive structure.
Finally, we construct a measure of knowledge that captures whether individuals simply understand the sign of their pension gain, KNOW_SIGN is equal to 1 if the employer and self-reports of pension gain are both positive, both negative, or if both are equal to 0. Fifty-five percent of individuals reporting key pension values have self-reports that lead to a pension gain of the same sign as the employer report.
The knowledge measures that include Social Security are constructed in a similar fashion to those for private pensions only. Unfortunately, the self-reported data on expected Social Security benefits are much less extensive than the self-reported pension data. Specifically, individuals are asked only for their expected Social Security benefit amount at their expected retirement age. Thus, for Social Security, we can only create a knowledge measure that indicates whether the expected level of benefits at that expected retirement age is close to the level we calculate from Social Security Administration data. 11 It is not possible to construct a measure similar to KNOW_GAIN for Social Security benefits. Another limitation is that only a single respondent per household was asked to provide expected benefit information. To avoid using a spouse's knowledge of Social Security benefits to determine an individual's behavior, we include only those individuals who directly report their own expected Social Security benefit in this analysis. Just 40% of the sample reports their anticipated Social Security benefits, with most of the missing values due to the relevant household member not being asked the question. Among the subsample providing information, more than three-quarters are reasonably accurate in their expected Social Security benefit level.
III. Empirical Strategy and Results
A. Comparing the Effect of Self-and Employer-Reported Incentives on Retirement
We begin by directly comparing the effect of financial retirement incentives, calculated from employer-and selfreported pension data. Following much recent empirical work, we estimate a retirement equation described by
where R it is a binary variable indicating that individual i retires in year t, and ε is an error term. GAIN it represents the pension gain to continued work, as defined above, based on employer-reported pension data. Samwick (1998) and Coile and Gruber (2000) show that forward-looking measures such as pension gain have greater explanatory power than alternative myopic summary measures of financial status or incentives. X it is a vector that contains control variables, including race, education, gender, self-reported health status, marital status, dummy variables for age, the level of nonpension assets, the level of pension wealth, a measure of average lifetime earnings, and dummies for the survey wave. 12 In results not reported, we have also included indicators for retiree health insurance and an insurance indicator interacted with poor health. Adding these controls does not change our basic results and they are excluded here because of a large number of missing values for the retiree health insurance variables. The first column of table 3 shows the effects of pension gain calculated from the employer reports on the probability of retirement, using a probit model and all sample observations. Standard errors have been corrected to account for repeated observations from the same individual across survey waves. We present results for men and women pooled, although we have also obtained similar results when we estimate separate regressions for men and women. 13 As expected, the pension gain variable is negative and significant, implying that a larger gain to delaying retirement until a future optimal date reduces the likelihood of retirement. The estimated coefficient of Ϫ0.0179 shown in the first column implies that a $10,000 increase in pension gain would reduce the probability of retirement by approximately a quarter of a percentage point, or 3%. 14 This magnitude is close to that reported by Coile and Gruber (2000) for a similar measure including both pensions and Social Security. As in some earlier research, we find that the level of pension wealth (if retirement occurs immediately) has a positive and significant effect, suggesting that those with higher levels of pension wealth are more likely to retire. 15 The magnitude of this pension wealth effect, also similar to previous work, is quite small, with a $10,000 increment to pension wealth increasing retirement by less than one-tenth of a percentage point.
In the next column, we repeat the exercise, but restrict the sample to individuals who have valid self-reports of their pensions (REPORT ϭ 1). The coefficient on pension gain rises slightly, but is not significantly different from that in the first column, suggesting that restricting the sample to those with valid self-reported pension data does not systematically alter the estimated response to pension incentives.
In the third column of table 3, we use pension gain and pension wealth variables based on individuals' self-reports. The coefficient on self-reported pension gain is very close to the comparable coefficients based on employer reports and is statistically significant. In the fourth column, we include both the self-and employer-based versions of pension gain and pension wealth levels. As noted above, the correlation between the two measures of pension gain is 0.22. When 12 See Coile and Gruber (2000) for a discussion of the importance of carefully controlling for measures of lifetime earnings. It is also crucial to control fully for age because there are spikes and nonlinearities in the age profile of retirement probabilities and because knowledge may also be correlated with age. Thus, we include a series of dummy variables for each year of age (51 to 70) in our sample.
13 While none of the regression results shown below use the HRS sampling weights, we have estimated all specifications using these weights and find no substantive differences in our results from weighting.
14 Marginal reported effects are shown in italics below the standard errors in the tables and are calculated for a 60-year-old, married, white male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with all continuous variables set to their mean values. 15 We should note that some other previous work has not found a significant effect of the level of pension wealth on retirement probabilities. Samwick (1998) , for example, finds that the level of pension wealth has no effect on retirement once a forward-looking incentive measure is included in the model. Overall, however, these basic results are consistent both with theoretical predictions and with previous empirical work. Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS. Standard errors are in parentheses. The marginal effect of a $10,000 increase in the variable (calculated for a 60-year-old, married, white male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with all continuous variables set to their mean values) is shown in italics below the standard errors. The sample in columns 2-4 and 6-8 include only those for whom a self-reported pension gain can be calculated. Pension gain and wealth levels are in $10,000s. Other explanatory variables include race, education, health, marital status, nonpension assets, age, gender, wave, and average lifetime earnings. both are included, the self-reported pension gain variable remains statistically significant and is somewhat larger in magnitude than the employer-reported variable. Thus, the self-reported data do contain information relevant to individual decision-making. For pension wealth levels, the employer-reported variable remains statistically significant (although quite small), while the self-reported version does not.
Finally, in columns 5 through 8 of table 3 we repeat the above analyses, restricting the sample to those who have at least one DB plan. As mentioned above, we have greater confidence in our assumption that employer reports reflect the true pension for DB plans than for DC plans. The results show few differences when the sample is restricted to DB plans. In particular, in column 8 when we include both selfand employer-reported pension gain, the coefficient on the self-report remains significant and is slightly larger than that on the employer report.
B. Are Well-Informed Individuals More Responsive?
We next document differences in the responsiveness of individuals to financial incentives based on a variety of measures of their understanding of these incentives. To capture this possible heterogeneity, we modify equation (2) to allow a differential response by knowledge of pension incentives:
where, as before, R it is a binary variable indicating that the individual i retires in year t, GAIN it is the pension gain to continued work based on employer-reported pension data, and ε is an error term. With the exception of the terms associated with coefficients ␣ 2 and ␣ 3 , this specification is identical to that used in previous work. INFORMED it is one of the variables described above (and summarized in table 2) that attempts to capture the extent of individuals' knowledge of their pension benefits.
Probit estimates of equation 3 are shown in table 4. Columns 1-4 show effects for the full sample, while columns 5 through 8 show effects for the subsample of those with DB pensions (according to employer reports). Results are similar across the two samples, and we focus our discussion on results using individuals with DB plans. For ease of comparison, columns 1 and 5 replicate the results from the first and fifth columns of table 3 and show the negative and statistically significant effect of pension gain on the probability of retirement when knowledge is ignored. Marginal effects implied by the probit coefficients are shown at the bottom of the table, along with the change in the retirement probability implied by the dummy variables for our various measures of knowledge.
In column 6 of table 4, we show that REPORT ϭ 1 (knowing, or at least reporting some guess of, the key components of a pension plan) is associated with an increased probability of retirement. Reporting all of the key pension plan values is associated with an annual probability of retirement that is approximately 3 percentage points higher. This may reflect reverse causality: individuals who Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS. Standard errors are in parentheses. The marginal effect of a $10,000 increase in pension gain and the change in probability of retirement is calculated for a 60-year-old, married, white male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with all continuous variables set to their mean values. Pension gain is in $10,000s and is based on employer reports. Other explanatory variables include pension wealth, race, education, health, marital status, nonpension assets, age, gender, wave, and average lifetime earnings.
are actively considering retirement may be more likely to know enough to report some values for their pension plan. There is no significant interaction between this knowledge measure and pension gain.
Column 7 of table 4 displays results using KNOW_ LEVEL (being reasonably well-informed about the level of pension wealth). These results suggest that individuals with better knowledge of their pension wealth levels may show a greater responsiveness to pension-related incentives in making the retirement decision. The total effect of pension gain on retirement is statistically significant only for wellinformed individuals. The interaction between KNOW_ LEVEL and pension gain is, however, not statistically different from 0.
In column 8 of table 4, we use KNOW_GAIN (being reasonably well-informed about the size of pension gain) as our measure of INFORMED. This specification produces much stronger evidence of heterogeneity in responsiveness to pension incentives, as expected since the knowledge measure captures knowledge of the relevant incentive to retire. The main coefficient on pension gain, capturing the effect of employer-reported pension gain for individuals whose selfreports are substantially different than their employer reports (or who do not report enough information to construct it), is very small and no longer statistically significant. The interaction between pension gain and KNOW_GAIN, however, is significant and implies a marginal effect that is over five times as large as the coefficient on pension gain by itself in column 5. This suggests that all of the responsiveness to pension incentives is driven by the 20% of the sample who correctly perceive the incentive to delay retirement. Among individuals who meet this definition of informed, a $10,000 increase in pension gain lowers the annual probability of retirement by 1.7 percentage points, or 20%. The main effect of KNOW_GAIN is also large and statistically significant: individuals who know their pension gain are 6 percentage points more likely to retire in a given year.
We have also tried dropping from the sample individuals who do not report enough information to form a selfreported measure of pension gain (REPORT ϭ 0 and thus, INFORMED ϭ 0). This allows us to distinguish between individuals who simply do not report information on their pensions and those who report values that are very different from their employer reports. These results are very similar to those reported in table 4.
We have also repeated some of the above analysis using the measure of GAIN constructed from both pensions and Social Security. As noted above, the sample size is dramatically reduced when we require both self-reported and administratively reported data on Social Security. The coefficient on GAIN combining both pension and Social Security benefits is slightly smaller than the effect of pension incentives alone, and is statistically significant. However, knowledge of the level of these Social Security benefits is not significantly related to retirement behavior: neither the main effect nor the interaction effect is statistically significant. We view this result primarily as a reflection of the limited data available on individuals' knowledge of their Social Security benefits.
We have explored several alternative definitions of the knowledge variables. In particular, we tried altering the definition of KNOW_GAIN to allow for different degrees of error in determining who knew their pension gain accurately. For example, we considered definitions in which the ratio of self-to employer-reported pension gain was between 0.75 and 1.25, and other cutoffs. The coefficients on KNOW_GAIN were not sensitive to these cutoffs. This suggests that individuals may be responding to something other than the precise dollar values of their pension gain. One possibility is that individuals retire when they face a zero gain or a loss from continuing to work. If this is the case, it may be enough if individuals simply understand the sign of their pension gain. To explore this possibility, we use KNOW_SIGN (knowing the sign of pension gain) as the measure of pension knowledge.
The results of interacting KNOW_SIGN with pension gain are shown in table 5. Here we focus exclusively on the DB pension subsample since it is impossible for DC pensions to have negative pension gain. 16 Column 1 simply 16 It is possible to estimate these effects for the DC pension sample as well. Many individuals with employer reports indicating DC plans (which virtually always produce a positive value of pension gain) misreport their pension type as a DB plan, and so can have negative values for pension gain. Results for the full sample are similar to those in table 5. Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS. Standard errors are in parentheses. Pension gain is in $10,000s and is based on employer reports. Other explanatory variables include pension wealth, race, education, health, marital status, nonpension assets, age, gender, wave, and average lifetime earnings.
repeats the fifth columns of tables 3 and 4 for ease of comparison. In column 2, we show that there is no statistically significant response to pension gain among the roughly 40% of the sample that does not know whether they stand to gain or lose pension wealth from continuing to work. In contrast, those who know the sign of pension gain have the expected negative and significant response to the financial incentive measure, and the magnitude of their response is more than four times that of the average response to pension gain from column 1.
Finally, since the sign of pension gain appears to be an important piece of individual knowledge, we consider whether the sign alone can explain retirement behavior. In column 3 of table 5 we show results of a model of retirement with a dummy variable for negative pension gain. This dummy is positive and significant, consistent with those who are past their pension wealth peak being substantially more likely to retire; the retirement probability is almost doubled for those with negative pension gain. Column 4 shows this specification with the relevant interactions with KNOW_SIGN. As expected, the interaction between KNOW_SIGN and having a negative pension gain is large, positive, and statistically significant.
In the lower half of table 5, we illustrate the magnitudes of these estimated effects by calculating the probability of retirement for combinations of KNOW_SIGN and whether pension gain is positive (or 0) or negative. There are large differences between those with positive and negative pension gain values among the informed group, with probabilities moving from 0.034 to 0.277 as pension gain becomes negative. In contrast, those who are not informed according to this measure show very little difference in retirement probabilities with pension gain. It is also worth noting that the main effect of this knowledge measure does not always serve to increase the probability of retirement. For individuals with a positive pension gain (that is, those who can increase pension wealth by deferring retirement into the future), being knowledgeable is associated with a lower probability of retirement (0.034) relative to those who have a positive pension gain but are not aware of this (0.086). This suggests that at least some of the main effect of knowledge does not reflect a reverse causality in which individuals only become informed when they are on the verge of retirement, since in this case knowledge is associated with a lower probability of retirement.
C. The Consequences of Misinformation
In the next section, we further consider the appropriate interpretation of our results, but taken at face value, they suggest significant "mistakes" in retirement decisionmaking, as the result of misinformation. If the costs of obtaining information on one's pension are reasonably low, this raises questions about the value of the information. How costly is it, for example, to retire according to one's perceived pension incentive, rather than the true incentive?
To address this issue, we calculate the difference in the present value of pension wealth (from the employer reports) if retirement occurs at the wealth-maximizing age, versus the present value if retirement occurs at the self-reported wealth-maximizing age (but using wealth values from the employer reports). While not all individuals will retire at the wealth-maximizing age, this gives us a rough idea of the potential cost of responding to perceived pension incentives rather than the true incentives.
For the full sample of individuals with both employer and self-reports of pension values, the median difference in pension wealth calculated in this way is roughly $3,000, or 3% of the maximum pension wealth from the employer reports. This, of course, includes very small differences for those who are well-informed. When we calculate this gap among the uninformed, the values are substantial. Among those with KNOW_GAIN ϭ 0, the median reduction in maximum pension wealth from misinformation is $6,900, or roughly 6% of pension wealth at the wealth-maximizing age. The 75th percentile of this distribution is more than $20,000, or 18% of pension wealth. Similarly, among those with KNOW_SIGN ϭ 0, the median difference in pension wealth at the employer-and self-reported wealthmaximizing ages is more than $9,000, and the 75th percentile difference is almost $24,000. While it can be subjective to categorize magnitudes as large or small, it does not seem easy to dismiss these dollar amounts as economically unimportant. Individuals who do not have detailed pension information may stand to lose substantial portions of their pension wealth. 17 These differences in perceived and true pension incentives, along with the table 3 results showing that individuals do respond to their self-reports, suggest a potentially important role for misinformation in affecting individual retirement behavior. To illustrate the possible magnitude of such effects, we perform a simple simulation based on the regression results from column 3 of table 3. Specifically we predict retirement probabilities at each age, first using the self-reported pension incentive and then replacing the selfreported pension gain with the employer-reported version. We next calculate the implied labor force survival probabilities at each age based on the actual and counterfactual retirement probabilities (and assuming no labor force reentry for simplicity). If individuals responded according to the coefficient estimated using self-reported data, but had beliefs that reflected the employer-based pension gain values, labor force participation rates would be 2 to 5 percentage points lower between the ages of 57 and 63. If we restrict the simulation to only those individuals who are not wellinformed about their pension plans (have KNOW_GAIN ϭ 0), the simulated difference in labor force participation rates is between 5 and 8 percentage points. This suggests that there may be important behavioral consequences of incomplete information. Of course, these simulations ignore potential endogeneity concerns, and so may represent an upper bound on the behavioral effects. We address some of these concerns and further explore these basic findings in the subsequent sections.
D. Do Uninformed Individuals Respond to Perceived
Incentives?
One interpretation of the results thus far is that knowledge can have powerful effects on individual behavior. We are cautious in reaching such a conclusion, however, since it is likely that at least some information acquisition is not exogenous to the retirement decision. One possible explanation for our finding of stronger responsiveness among the knowledgeable, for example, is that individuals might determine how much information to gather based on how likely they are to take account of that information in making retirement decisions. 18 In this case, causality runs from dispersion in responsiveness to dispersion in knowledge and some individuals will be uninformed because they have no intention of taking financial incentives into account in choosing a retirement date.
This poses a challenge for estimation of causal effects, similar to the issues raised in the literature on estimating heterogeneous returns to education (see Card, 1999 , for a discussion). Given the lack of any convincing instruments for pension knowledge in this situation, we cannot formally rule out this possibility. 19 However, by considering the role that self-reported pension incentives play in retirement decisions, we are able to provide some evidence that this form of endogeneity is not driving our results. If it is simply the case that those who are responsive gather information, while those who are unresponsive do not (because information collection is costly and does not benefit them in any way), then the nonresponders should not respond to any pension information, including their own self-reported information. We have shown in tables 4 and 5 that misinformed individuals do not respond to the administratively reported pension incentive, but do these same misinformed individuals respond to their self-reported and objectively incorrect incentive? Or, are they simply nonresponsive to any incentive whatsoever? Table 6 produces results analogous to those in table 4, but focuses on self-reported pension information (rather than employer reports) interacted with the knowledge measures. The first column reproduces column 6 of table 3, where we estimated the average effect of employer-reported pension gain on retirement for the DB sample with a valid selfreport. In the second column, we use self-reported pension gain, KNOW_GAIN, and their interaction. The main coefficient on self-reported pension gain, which reflects the responsiveness of uninformed individuals, is statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the coefficient on employer-reported pension gain in column 1. This suggests that the uninformed group cannot be characterized as nonresponsive to financial incentives in general. It remains true, however, that the better-informed group has a larger response to self-reported pension gain, as shown by the interaction of KNOW_GAIN and pension gain. The fact that the uninformed do show a statistically significant response to their perceived pensions (which is never the case when we use the employer-reported pension gain) suggests that at least some of the effect is running from individuals' information sets to their retirement behavior. The results in the third column, where we use KNOW_SIGN as our measure of information, are even more striking. There is only a small 18 In preliminary research that looks at how self-reported pension values change over time in the HRS, Chan and Stevens (2006) have not found strong evidence that people become disproportionately more accurate about their pensions as they approach actual retirement. This echoes the findings of Gustman and Steinmeier (2001b) who show relatively small improvements in pension accuracy with age. Such patterns are not consistent with people gathering most of their information once they have decided to retire in the immediate future. 19 We have attempted to explore this possibility directly by estimating a selection model in which the level of information about one's pension is estimated jointly with the decision to retire. Such a model, however, is unlikely to be identified empirically since it requires data on factors that help predict individual knowledge about their pension, but that can be excluded from a model of the retirement decision. We are not convinced that such factors exist, and so do not report the full results from our selection model here. None of our main results are altered by allowing for selection into informed and not informed states. Notes: Probit coefficients estimated using data from waves 1-4 of the HRS. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes only those for whom a self-reported pension gain can be calculated. The marginal effect of a $10,000 increase in pension gain and the change in probability of retirement is calculated for a 60-year-old, married, white male, with some college education, observed in wave 2, and with all continuous variables set to their mean values. Self-and employer-reported pension gains are in $10,000s. Other explanatory variables include pension wealth, race, education, health, marital status, nonpension assets, age, gender, wave, and average lifetime earnings. difference in the responsiveness of informed and misinformed individuals to their own perceptions of pension gain when our measure of knowledge is simply whether they are aware of the sign of their incentive. The uninformed do respond to financial incentives, but only to their perceived values of these incentives.
E. Can Measurement Error Explain These Results?
Our results thus far suggest a potentially important role for self-reported pension data, or individual knowledge of pension details, in retirement decision-making. Other interpretations of these results arise, however, if we take seriously the issues of measurement error that were discussed earlier. Individuals that we classify as "uninformed" (because their self-report deviates substantially from their employer report) may actually be those who have particularly severe measurement error in either their employer-or selfreported data, or both. Accordingly, "informed" individuals may appear more responsive to incentives simply because the measured incentives contain less measurement error, and not because their actual beliefs are more accurate. Given the two available sources of pension data, it is probably impossible to account for measurement error and the role of information simultaneously. We can, however, present several pieces of evidence to show that our results are not driven primarily by measurement error.
First, the similarity of estimates across the full and DB samples in tables 3 and 4 suggests that measurement error in employer reports is not a major issue for our main results, because if it were, the effects should weaken when we eliminate those with only DC pension plans. Second, if measurement error in employer reports is important, it should affect the specifications involving KNOW_LEVEL as well as those using KNOW_GAIN since both measures are constructed from the same raw data. Indeed, KNOW_ LEVEL should be a particularly good measure of potential measurement error in the employer reports since problems with employers' knowing DC account balances would primarily affect the level of pension wealth from employer reports, not the calculated retirement incentives. However, the results in table 4 show no significant interaction between KNOW_LEVEL and pension gain (that is, the "uninformed" are not less responsive according to this definition of IN-FORMED) . This suggests that these knowledge measures are picking up the accuracy of beliefs, rather than simply proxying for measurement error in the employer reports.
Finally, if measurement error is of substantial concern in both the self-and employer-reported data, and if information plays no role in determining the responsiveness of individuals to financial incentives, an alternative estimation strategy would be to instrument the pension gain based on employer reports with the pension gain based on selfreports, and vice versa. Suppose we start with pension gain based on self-reports (GAIN SR ) as the key variable of interest to summarize the relevant retirement incentive, but recognize that it may be measured with error. Using pension gain based on employer reports (GAIN ER ) as an instrument will produce an estimate of the effect of pension incentives that is unbiased due to measurement error under two conditions:
(a) GAIN SR is correlated with GAIN ER (after controlling for other exogenous variables) (b) cov(GAIN ER , ε SR ) ϭ 0, where ε SR is the error term in a retirement equation that includes GAIN SR and the other control variables.
We can show that condition (a) is satisfied in our data, and condition (b) will be satisfied if the employer reports do not affect retirement once the self-reported GAIN has been included.
In contrast, suppose that we start with GAIN ER as the key (but noisy) variable of interest and instrument with GAIN SR . Now, condition (b) for an unbiased estimate will become (c) cov(GAIN SR , ε ER ) ϭ 0, where ε ER is the error term in a retirement equation that includes GAIN ER and the other control variables.
If beliefs are not important determinants of retirement behavior except as a proxy for true pensions, condition (c) will be satisfied, and we will have a second instrumental variable that provides a consistent estimate of the effect of pensions on retirement. In this case, it will be measurement error (and not individual beliefs) that determines the difference in estimated individual responsiveness between the OLS and IV regressions. The two alternative IV estimates should be similar to each other, assuming that measurement error in the two pension gain measures are independent of one another.
If, however, individual beliefs about pensions are important determinants of retirement behavior, condition (c) will not hold, and pension gain from the self-reports will not be a valid instrument for employer-reported pension gain. The inconsistency of the IV coefficient when we instrument GAIN ER with GAIN SR will be a function of cov(GAIN SR , ε R )/cov(GAIN SR , GAIN ER ). 20 Thus, if conditions (a) and (b) hold, but (c) does not, the two alternative IV estimates should differ substantially. Table 7 shows the results from OLS and IV regressions in which we (i) instrument the self-reports with the employer reports and (ii) instrument the employer reports with the self-reports, for both the full sample and the sample of those with DB plans only. If both sources of data provide poorly measured proxies for the pension incentives faced by wellinformed individuals, and there are no effects of individual beliefs, we should expect the two IV estimates to be similar to one another. This is not the case.
In columns 1 and 2 in which the self-reported pension gain is instrumented with the employer-reported version, the IV coefficients are considerably larger than the OLS coefficients, which suggests possibly substantial measurement error in the self-reports. On the other hand, this result could also occur if having a correct self-report (one that is closer to the true pension gain) leads to greater responsiveness. Individuals may simply respond less to a best guess of their pension that they know is unlikely to be accurate.
In columns 3 and 4 of table 7, where the employerreported values are instrumented with the self-reports, the evidence is consistent with substantial bias in the IV estimates. The IV coefficients are orders of magnitude larger than the OLS coefficients, and, although quite imprecisely estimated, are implausibly large. It seems impossible to attribute the difference between OLS and these IV coefficients to measurement error alone. While none of the IV coefficients in table 7 are very precisely estimated, the difference between results in the first two columns of table 7 and the latter two columns is not supportive of the idea that the self-and employer reports should be viewed as approximately equally noisy proxies for the true pension benefits. More likely, as results throughout this paper have suggested, the role of individual knowledge or beliefs about pension incentives are an important part of the story.
IV. Conclusion
This paper documents the differential responsiveness to economic incentives by knowledge of those incentives in the case of retirement decision-making. Specifically, we have shown that there is important heterogeneity in how individuals respond to financial factors in choosing a retirement date, and that this heterogeneity is directly related to individuals' level of knowledge about these incentives. This finding is important since the existing literature on retirement decision-making has largely ignored information issues, and since researchers have tended to ignore selfreported data on pensions when they are available. A limitation of our findings is that we cannot yet say with certainty whether they reflect an exogenous effect of information provision, or whether information gathering and retirement decision-making are jointly determined. Future work should focus on disentangling this difficult empirical problem. Finally, we show that, rather than being unresponsive, misinformed individuals do respond to their perceived, but incorrect, pension information.
A final contribution of this study is that we demonstrate the usefulness of self-reported data as collected in the Health and Retirement Study and other surveys. Individuals respond directly to these self-reports of pensions, suggesting that they do capture the economic incentives that individuals perceive themselves to be facing. The self-reported pension data provide an important intermediate step between administrative reports of pensions and the retirement response of individuals. Rather than being substitutes for one another, the self-and employer-reported data are complements in understanding individual responses to retirement incentives. Notes: Each cell represents the coefficient on pension gain from a separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. IV estimates in columns 1 and 2 are self-reported pension gain instrumented with employer-reported. IV estimates in columns 3 and 4 are employer-reported pension gain instrumented with self-reported.
DATA APPENDIX
Self-Reported Pension Data
The procedure described below was used to calculate for each selfreported pension the present value of pension wealth available at each possible future retirement age. These were aggregated to generate for all pensions an overall present value of pension wealth at each possible future retirement age. These aggregate present values were used to construct the pension gain measures described in the text (see the discussion surrounding equation [1] ). In all these present-value calculations, the discount rate was set to 3%, and age-gender-specific survival probabilities were taken from Social Security Administration actuarial tables.
For DB pensions, benefit levels could be reported as a percentage of pay at the time of retirement, and for DC pensions, employer and employee contributions could be reported as a percentage of the current pay. In both cases, a pay forecast is required for each possible future age of the individual. These pay forecasts are based on wage growth projections by gender, education, and age. For the older workers included in our sample, the estimated average real wage growth over time is quite low, at around 1% per year.
For all DB pensions, respondents are asked for retirement benefit information at three possible retirement ages:
(i) The age that "you expect to start receiving benefits from this plan." (ii) "The earliest age at which you would be eligible to receive full or unreduced pension benefits from this job." This was also described to respondents as the "normal retirement age." (iii) "The earliest age at which you could leave this employer/ business and start to receive pension benefits." This was prefaced with "Some plans allow retirement at an earlier age, usually with reduced benefits" earlier in the survey.
For each of these three ages, annual benefit amounts were calculated from the self-reported information. Benefit amounts were assumed to remain constant between these retirement ages. For possible future ages of retirement after the earliest eligibility age (iii), but not corresponding to the normal age (ii) or the expected benefit receipt age (i), we assume that the benefit formula follows the most recent of the above three ages and annual retirement benefits are calculated accordingly. In the case of ages before the earliest eligibility age, we assume that benefits will be zero. The present value of pension wealth at each future possible retirement age is then calculated using the discount and survival parameters described above. These present values are updated using self-reported pension information from each wave of the data.
For DC accounts, respondents are asked about their balance, and their own and their employer's contributions. These contribution rates are assumed to hold until they are updated in the next wave of data. DC account holders are also asked, "Is the money in this account invested mostly in stocks, mostly in interest-earning assets, is it about evenly split between these, or what?" If the respondent answered "mostly or all stock," then the rate of return on this account was set to 8%. If the respondent answered "mostly or all interest earning," then the rate of return was set to 3%. If the response was "split," then the rate of return was set to 5.5%. The rate of return for all other responses, including "don't know" and those who said they had no choice in how the account is invested, was set at 3%. For consistency with the pension calculation program used for the employer reports, we have also calculated returns assuming a 3% rate of return for all accounts. This produces almost identical results. These account balances, contribution rates, and rates of return are then used in conjunction with the discount and survival parameters to calculate the present value of that pension for each possible future retirement age.
Cost-of-living adjustments (assuming a 3% rate of inflation) are incorporated into pension benefit amounts only when individuals report that their benefits are subject to such adjustments.
For individuals already receiving pension benefits from old jobs, there is information on current benefit receipts and current account balances from previous jobs. The present value of these are also added to the aggregate present value of pension wealth calculations.
Employer-Reported Pension Data
Pension gain-and pension wealth-level variables were constructed from the employer-reported pension data using the Pension Estimation Program (Curtin, 1998) provided by the HRS. For DB pension plans, the program uses the detailed plan information to construct estimates of pension wealth at each possible retirement age from the current age until age 70. Because the employer-provided data are collected only at wave 1, we implicitly assume that none of the plan parameters change after the initial survey wave. As noted in the text, if individuals report a change in their pension plan with the same employer after wave 1, they are eliminated from our sample.
For DC pension plans, the pension estimator makes assumptions regarding key individual-specific features of employees' pension plans. There are a number of problems with these calculations that provide another justification for our focus on DB plans in most of our analysis. In particular, the Pension Estimation Program must impute each individual's current account balance. It assumes that individuals working for firms that currently have DC plans have been receiving the current level of employer contributions since their date of hire. As is documented in Engelhardt, Cunningham, and Kumar (2005) , this is problematic since it implies that some individuals will have been receiving contributions to DC pensions for longer than DC-type pension plans have been in existence. This may lead to an overstatement of DC account balances since actual contributions for many workers did not start at their date of hire. Similarly, employers do not know or report on voluntary contributions to pension plans. Voluntary contributions are held constant at the level reported by the participants themselves in the first wave of the HRS. An additional problem raised by the DC plans is that the use of self-reported data as inputs to the employer-reported pension estimation blurs the distinction between self-and employer-reported data that is a main focus of our work.
Contributions and the rate of return on balances are assumed not to change after the initial survey wave. For DC plans, we set the parameters of the pension calculation program so that the rate of return earned on account balances is 3% per year. We have tried altering the assumed rate of return, and our constructed knowledge variables are not substantively affected by these changes.
For DB plans, rates of wage growth are set to 1%, consistent with the assumption (based on wage regressions) we make in the self-reported pension calculations. The Pension Estimation Program parameters are set to allow for inflation adjusting of starting benefit amounts. Cost-of-living adjustments to ongoing benefits are incorporated only when the plan summaries explicitly have a formal COLA provision.
